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David Roberts's avatar

We are told repeatedly in the Torah and the Gospels that we have an obligation to care for the stranger, precisely because it is not our natural, human instinct to do so. And when we do care for a stranger, whether in our home city or on another continent, we are practicing Imatatio Dei.

Thanks for this reminder, Jerusalem.

CleverBeast's avatar

I think there is something of a point to criticism of “empathy,” at least as it often manifests among liberals and the left, although I have somewhat different criticisms of it than the right.

Primarily, I believe we should not trust empathy as a tool around which to organize our politics, because it is fundamentally easier to empathize with people familiar to us—or who we imagine to be similar to us—than with those who have radically different values and experiences.

This has two failure modes, one in which we limit moral worth to those we can easily empathize with, which is what Vance seems to be arguing for, and one in which we deceive ourselves about how similar people are to us in order to make empathizing with them easier.

In the failure mode common on the right, political empathy easily supports a politics based on the Schmittian “friend-enemy distinction,” because it is easier to empathize with a friend than an enemy.

On the left, political empathy and moral universalism often combine in such a way as to sand off the rough edges of groups or individuals whose experiences can be framed as tragic, and therefore empathetic. Motivations which cannot be understood by the educated, oversocialized, socially liberal person doing the enpathizing are dismissed, explained away (often by pathologizing beliefs as “a product of [tragedy]”), or simply ignored.

This is less immediately dangerous than right-wing empathy-driven dehumanization, but it nonetheless provides an excuse for brutality and unnecessary violence. This is what the right calls “suicidal empathy,” and they have a point, although they use the term so broadly and carelessly that it is hard to take them seriously. Even when the stakes are lower, this selective empathy still distorts our view of reality, shrinking our perspective on the vast number of ways a human can experience reality.

Good examples of this failure mode include left wing support for terrorism around the world, tolerance of regressive social views held by Black nationalists, conservative Muslims and Islamists, or indigenous rights groups.

In the short term, these individuals and groups often do benefit from empathy from rich westerners which an honest appraisal of their values would have denied them. Some people surely lie about such peoples’ values on these grounds, and in an ideal world victims of injustice would not need to be easy to empathize themselves to receive aid. But insofar as you are motivated by a genuine desire to help some person or culture, are you really doing them a favor by misunderstanding their values?

A corollary of this failure is the tendency towards intracultural hatred, atrophying tolerance, and black-and-white thinking. If every sympathetic culture you encounter is conceived of as morally perfect, then your own culture ceases to have distinct strengths you can praise. If your understanding of the diversity of human values is artificially constrained, when you do finally encounter people whose values differ sharply from yours, you are less likely to be tolerant—especially if they are not particularly sympathetic. Finally, if the people you empathize with are perfect victims, then those who have wronged them must be maximally villainous.

To summarize:

The empathetic nativist correctly perceives that some peoples are different, and denies the common humanity of those people as a result. The empathetic universalist zealot correctly perceives our common humanity, but as a result denies the moral responsibility or moral evils of the most pitiable people—people with whom they wish to empathize, but whose strangeness or moral repulsiveness makes true empathy hard.

The real difficulty of empathy is learning how to empathize with people who you think are deeply wrong, who are utterly alien to you, or who you believe to be evil. I am not a Christian, and so I have no issues with saying that I do not think this is possible for all people in all cases. Loving one another is an acceptable religious commandment, but liberal politics should be based around the achievable, not the aspirational.

It is sufficient, that in some circumstances, I accept that some people’s minds present an insurmountable barrier to my understanding—but I will tolerate them nonetheless.

Tolerance, and an ideological commitment to rule of law and individual equality within the law, are achievable where universal empathy is not.

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